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PROTECTING PRIVACY ABSENT A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: A PLAUSIBLE 
SOLUTION TO SAFEGUARDING  
MEDICAL RECORDS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Diabetes is no longer just a disease; it is now an epidemic.1 Diabetes, a 
noninfectious, chronic disease that inhibits the body’s ability to produce 
and use insulin,2 affects around twenty-one million Americans.3 In an 
effort to study and control the growing number of diabetes cases in 
America, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
(DOHMH) recently implemented a revolutionary program to monitor and 
evaluate diabetes in conjunction with patient care.4 The unprecedented 
program, which took effect in January of 2006, is unique because it 
monitors a noninfectious disease.5 Historically, governments have 
implemented such programs only for infectious, communicable diseases, 
such as HIV and tuberculosis, which pose a public health threat of 
spreading among the population.6 By including diabetes in its public 
 
 
 1. New York City officials now identify diabetes as an epidemic because more than one in eight 
New Yorkers suffers from the disease. “Diabetes is the only major disease in the city that is growing, 
both in the number of new cases and the number of people it kills.” N. R. Kleinfield, Diabetes and Its 
Awful Toll Quietly Emerge as a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at A1. 
 2. There are multiple types of diabetes; however, Types I and II are the most common. Type I 
diabetes occurs when the body destroys the cells that produce insulin in the pancreas. Id. Without 
insulin, the body cannot control its blood sugar levels. Type I diabetes is very serious and is typically 
diagnosed at a young age. American Diabetes Association, Type I Diabetes, http://www.diabetes.org/ 
type-1-diabetes.jsp (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). Type II diabetes occurs when the body develops a 
resistance to insulin. American Diabetes Association, Type 2 Diabetes, http://www.diabetes.org/type-
2-diabetes.jsp (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). Typically, Type II diabetes occurs later in life and may be 
prevented by changes in diet and exercise. Kleinfield, supra note 1. Type II diabetes accounts for 
ninety to ninety-five percent of all diabetes cases. Id.  
 3. American Diabetes Association, All About Diabetes, http://www.diabetes.org/about-
diabetes.jsp (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). 
 4. See Rob Stein, New York City Starts to Monitor Diabetics, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2006, at 
A3. 
 5. Id. DOHMH’s purported goals of the two-part program are surveillance and evaluation, 
environmental modification, policy development and regulation, direct provision and monitoring of 
clinical care, and health education. LYNN D. SILVER & DIANA K. BERGER, IMPROVING DIABETES 
CARE FOR ALL NEW YORKERS 19, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/diabetes/diabetes-
presentation-a1c-registry.pdf. For a detailed discussion of DOHMH’s program, see Amy L. Fairchild 
& Ava Alkon, Back to the Future? Diabetes, HIV, and the Boundaries of Public Health, 32 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 561 (2007). 
 6. Stein, supra note 4. See also Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in 
the Age of AIDS: Legislative Options, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 164 (1990). 
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health programs, DOHMH has expanded its notion of public health and 
the government’s role in disease monitoring and control. 
New York City’s diabetes program has two components: a registry and 
a pilot intervention program.7 The registry component, known as the New 
York City A1C Registry (NYCAR), requires all 120 of New York City’s 
medical testing laboratories to report the results of A1C blood tests8 to 
DOHMH.9 Diabetic patients undergo A1C blood tests every three to six 
months during regularly scheduled medical appointments.10 Along with 
each patient’s A1C blood test results, medical laboratories report to 
DOHMH each patient’s full name, date of birth, the name and address of 
the patient’s physician, the address where the A1C test was conducted, and 
the date the test results became available.11 DOHMH officials use this 
information to survey, map, and describe the emerging diabetes 
epidemic.12 Individual patients with poor A1C blood test results13 receive 
a letter notifying them of their test results along with resource material 
about diabetes.14 
The second component of the program utilizes the NYCAR registry to 
proactively influence the treatment of diabetes patients.15 In a pilot 
intervention program16 restricted solely to the South Bronx, city officials 
use the confidential information obtained through the registry to directly 
contact diabetes patients and their physicians.17 In addition to receiving a 
nonconsensual initial letter sent by the registry, individual patients are also 
contacted periodically by telephone to discuss their A1C blood test results 
and how to manage their diabetes.18 The caller contacting them is not a 
 
 
 7. See The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), Diabetes 
Prevention and Control, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/diabetes/diabetes-nycar.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2007). 
 8. A1C blood tests provide long-term measurements of a patient’s blood sugar levels by 
indexing blood glucose levels over the past ninety days. Id.  
 9. N.Y., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 (2006). See also Diabetes Prevention and Control, 
supra note 7; Stein, supra note 4.  
 10. Robert Steinbrook, Facing the Diabetes Epidemic—Mandatory Reporting of Glycosylated 
Hemoglobin Values in New York City, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 545, 546 (2006). 
 11. N.Y., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.03 (2006). Accord Steinbrook, supra note 10. 
 12. SILVER & BERGER, supra note 5, at 25.  
 13. The DOHMH defines poor A1C blood tests as >8.0%. The optimal A1C blood test result is 
7.0%. Id. at 27. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Diabetes Prevention and Control, supra note 7. 
 16. The program began in July 2007 and it is unclear how long it will last. Steinbrook, supra note 
10, at 546.  
 17. Stein, supra note 4. 
 18. SILVER & BERGER, supra note 5, at 27. A patient is contacted when his A1C test results 
exceed 8.0%. Id. The initial letter to the patient includes educational resource material about diabetes 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/5
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physician, but rather a government official.19 Patients may opt out of the 
program after the initial contact by filling out a “Do Not Contact” form.20 
A separate government caller also contacts the patients’ physicians to 
discuss the patients’ A1C blood test results and suggest recommendations 
for treatment.21 If the South Bronx program proves successful,22 then 
DOHMH hopes to extend the program to all of New York City.23 
New York City’s revolutionary diabetes program, and in particular the 
pilot intervention program, raises serious privacy concerns.24 These 
privacy concerns include the government’s access to and accumulation of 
personal information, the ability of the government caller to influence a 
patient’s decision to seek medical treatment without first speaking with his 
physician, the potential impact on the patient’s health insurance and 
employment should the information be released, the government’s 
infiltration of the physician’s traditional role as caregiver, and the general 
concern that the government may seek more regulation in this area over 
time.25 Furthermore, many of the policy concerns traditionally used to 
justify public health surveillance and control programs, such as 
transmission prevention,26 are inapplicable to this program because 
diabetes is not communicable and therefore poses a different type of 
 
 
and the opt-out “Do Not Contact” form, which must be completed and returned by the patient in order 
to take full effect. Id. Accord Diabetes Prevention and Control, supra note 7.  
 19. SILVER & BERGER, supra note 5. 
 20. Diabetes Prevention and Control, supra note 7. The “Do Not Contact” consent form has been 
criticized because most patients are not made aware of it, nor do they have access to the technology 
necessary to complete the form online. Elizabeth M. Whelan, Big Brother Will See You Now, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE, Apr. 25, 2006, http://nationalreview.com/comment/whelan200604250655.asp.  
 21. SILVER & BERGER, supra note 5, at 27. DOHMH provides each physician with a quarterly 
report illustrating the A1C test results of their patients. Id. This report indicates when a patient’s A1C 
blood test results reach over 8.0%. The report also makes best practice recommendations that the 
physician is encouraged to follow. Id. 
 22. DOHMH has yet to explain what factors will be considered in determining whether the 
program is a success. 
 23. Stein, supra note 4. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, Understanding Privacy: The Basics, in 1 SEVENTH ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: EVOLVING LAWS AND PRACTICES IN A SECURITY DRIVEN WORLD, at 23 
(PLI Intellectual Property, Course Handbook Series No. G-865, 2006); Alison M. Jean, Note, Personal 
Health and Medical Information: The Need for More Stringent Constitutional Privacy Protection, 37 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1151, 1161–63 (2004). 
 26. These policy reasons include preventing the risk of harm to others, protecting incompetent 
persons, and preventing risk to self. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 88–93 (2000). The only legitimate policy rationale for regulating diabetes is preventing 
risk to self because, as a noncommunicable disease, diabetes cannot directly harm others. Preventing 
risk to self, however, is a very controversial policy justification firmly rooted in paternalism. Id. at 90. 
For this reason, the diabetes program differs greatly from AIDS and tuberculosis programs, which 
target preventing transmission.  
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public health threat.27 For all of these reasons, the constitutionality of New 
York City’s diabetes program may be called into question under privacy 
protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
clause.28  
Constitutional privacy protection in its current state, however, is ill-
equipped to deal with innovative privacy invasions,29 such as those created 
by New York City’s diabetes program. This Note proposes a different way 
to think about privacy protection in the context of increased government 
access to, and use of, medical records.30 Part II of this Note describes the 
history and current state of privacy protection provided by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  It explains the Supreme Court’s recognition and treatment of 
a constitutional right to confidentiality under the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the subsequent interpretations of that right by the courts of appeals.  
Part III offers an analysis of the split among the courts of appeals over 
how to interpret and apply the constitutional right to confidentiality.  
Finally, Part IV proposes that because the right to confidentiality offers 
inconsistent and inadequate privacy protection, privacy tort law offers a 
better solution for protecting medical records from improper government 
invasion.  
II. HISTORY 
Protecting privacy rights has been a concern of the American legal 
system since its creation.31 The Bill of Rights was created to protect, 
among other things, the privacy of American homes, private papers, and 
freedom of association from government intrusion.32 Despite the common 
belief that privacy is something the United States Constitution and our 
form of government are meant to protect, no clear definition of privacy 
exists in American law.33 In fact, a legal concept of privacy was not 
formally introduced into American law until 1928, when Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis asserted the existence of “the right to be let alone” 
 
 
 27. Because Type II diabetes can result from obesity and inactivity, New York City’s program 
has the added effect of largely targeting obese populations. Kleinfield, supra note 1. 
 28. See infra Parts II & III. The Fourteenth Amendment states, “[N]or shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
 31. Allen-Castellitto, supra note 25, at 27. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 28. The word “privacy” does not appear in the Constitution and no legal definition of 
privacy is universally accepted. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/5
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in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.34 It would take another 
thirty-seven years for the Supreme Court to expound a theory of 
constitutional privacy protection.35 The Court found that protection in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process.36  
A. Whalen v. Roe: Recognizing a Constitutional Right to Confidentiality 
Following a series of cases in which the Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process clause protects a 
fundamental right to privacy in certain specific situations,37 the Court was 
soon presented with the question of just how far it would extend that 
fundamental right. In Whalen v. Roe,38 the Supreme Court considered 
whether the State of New York could record and keep the names and 
addresses of all persons who obtained legal prescriptions for Schedule II 
drugs.39 The lawsuit, brought by several patients and their physicians, 
alleged that the New York Controlled Substances Act of 1972 violated 
both patients’ privacy and the doctor-patient relationship. The patients and 
doctors argued that the Act would cause persons in need of Schedule II 
 
 
 34. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that wiretapping of telephone 
conversations does amount to an unwarranted search and seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
Much earlier in his career, Justice Brandeis espoused the concept of “the right to be let alone” in an 
article titled “The Right to Privacy,” which he coauthored with Samuel D. Warren. See Samuel D. 
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). See also Daniel J. 
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1099–1102 (2002) (describing the conceptual 
development of “the right to be let alone”). 
 35. The Supreme Court did so in Griswold v. Connecticut, wherein the Court concluded that a 
fundamental right to privacy prohibits laws criminalizing birth control. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold 
v. Connecticut was the first in a series of cases in which the Supreme Court asserted a substantive due 
process right to privacy. Allen-Castellitto, supra note 25, at 30–31. In 1967, the Supreme Court 
established a privacy right and equality interests in interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 
1 (1967); see also Allen-Castellitto, supra note 25, at 31. In 1969, the Supreme Court acknowledged a 
privacy right to personal use of pornography in the home. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); see 
also Allen-Castellitto, supra note 25, at 31. In 1973, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental right 
to privacy prohibits categorical bans against abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also 
Allen-Castellitto, supra note 25, at 31. Today, these fundamental rights have come to encompass the 
autonomy branch of the right to privacy. See infra note 70. 
 36. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–86 (recognizing constitutional protection afforded to certain 
zones of privacy concerning fundamental rights); Allen-Castellitto, supra note 25, at 30.  
 37. See supra note 35. 
 38. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 39. Id. at 591. Schedule II drugs are a class of drugs that includes opium, opium derivatives, 
cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and methaqualone. Id. at 593 n.8 (citing N.Y. Pub. Health Law 
§ 3306 (McKinney, Supp. 1976–77)). These drugs have acceptable uses for certain diseases and 
conditions, such as epilepsy, narcolepsy, and severe pain. Id. Schedule II drugs are considered the 
most dangerous of all legitimate drugs. Id. at 593.  
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drugs to decline treatment, fearing misuse of the information and the 
potential stigmatization of being identified and labeled as “drug addicts.”40  
The New York Controlled Substances Act of 1972 required physicians 
to prepare Schedule II drug prescriptions on an official triplicate form.41 
One copy of the form was kept by the physician, one went to the 
dispensing pharmacist, and the third copy was sent to the New York 
Department of Health.42 Completed forms identified “the prescribing 
physician; the dispensing pharmacy; the drug and dosage; and the name, 
address, and age of the patient.”43  
In its analysis of the case, the Supreme Court recognized two privacy 
interests: “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters” and “the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.”44 The latter interest was well recognized by previous 
Supreme Court precedent; the former interest was not.45 Nonetheless, the 
Court found both interests guaranteed by the Constitution.46 After 
announcing this general principle, the Court next considered whether 
either privacy interest was violated in the present case.47 
The Supreme Court described the interest in nondisclosure of personal 
matters as “a genuine concern that the information will become publicly 
known and that it will adversely affect [patients’] reputations.”48 The 
Court acknowledged that, out of fear of disclosure, some patients might be 
reluctant to seek medical treatment or use the Schedule II drugs prescribed 
 
 
 40. Id. at 595. 
 41. Id. at 593. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 599–600. 
 45. See infra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 46. In its opinion, the Court “[r]ecogniz[ed] that in some circumstances [the duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosures] arguably has its roots in the Constitution . . . .” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. In 
support of its assertion of an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, the 
Supreme Court cited to Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 
(1928), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), 
and California Bankers Ass’n. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 79 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting), id. at 78 
(Powell, J., concurring). Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.25. Each of these cases found constitutional 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. In support of its assertion of an 
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions, the Supreme Court cited to 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and a string of other similar 
cases guaranteeing privacy protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600 
n.26. 
 47. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600. 
 48. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/5
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for them.49 Indeed, the patients argued that this fear adversely impacted 
vital decisions they made about their health.50 
Despite recognizing that the Health Department’s privacy invasion may 
lead some patients not to seek treatment,51 the Supreme Court held that the 
New York Controlled Substances Act violated neither “the individual 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” nor “the interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”52 Because 
the record did not support a finding that the information sent to the New 
York Department of Health would be disclosed,53 the Court saw no 
immediate or potential impact on the reputation of the patients.54 
Furthermore, the Court declined to find a violation of the patients’ liberty 
interest because the State had not entirely prohibited the use of Schedule II 
drugs.55 The Court also rejected the argument that the Act violated the 
doctor-patient relationship because the doctors’ actions were not altered in 
any way.56  
Recognizing the gravity of its decision, the Court closed with a final 
thought:  
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the 
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in 
computerized data banks or other massive government files . . . . 
 
 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 602. 
 52. Id. at 599–600. 
 53. As part of its analysis of the potential threat of disclosure, the Supreme Court identified three 
ways in which public disclosure of patient information could come about: 1) failure of the Department 
of Health to maintain security, 2) the information could be made available as evidence in a judicial 
proceeding, or 3) a doctor, pharmacist, or the patient may voluntarily reveal information on the 
prescription form. Id. at 600. The Court found sufficient evidence in the record to dispose of these 
concerns. Id. at 601. For example, the Act provided for security measures to be taken by the 
Department of Health. Id. at 593–94. Such security measures included locking the forms in a receiving 
room surrounded by a locked wire fence and protecting them with an alarm system. Id. As an aside, 
regarding the third option, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court did not include in its analysis 
the possibility that an official or employee of the Department of Health may voluntarily reveal the 
information on a patient’s prescription form.  
 54. The Court relied on two portions of the record to reach this conclusion. Id. at 602–03. One, 
the Court noted that the disclosures required by the Act were not meaningfully distinguishable from 
other disclosures of private medical information already pervasive in society. Id. at 602. Two, prior to 
the district court’s issuance of an injunction against the Act, around 100,000 Schedule II prescriptions 
were being filled per month. Id. at 603. This indicated to the Court that “the statute did not deprive the 
public of access to the drugs.” Id. 
 55. The Court went so far as to suggest that the State could prohibit use of all Schedule II drugs. 
Id. at 603. 
 56. Absent the statute, the physicians still had to fill out a written prescription identifying the 
name and address of the patient. Id. at 604.  
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Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty [of 
nondisclosure] arguably has its roots in the Constitution, 
nevertheless New York’s statutory scheme, and its implementing 
administrative procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and 
protection of, the individual’s interest in privacy.57  
B. Post-Whalen: The Supreme Court’s Limited Treatment of the Right to 
Confidentiality 
Whalen v. Roe provided little guidance for lower courts dealing with 
medical privacy issues. Regarding the first of the Court’s dual privacy 
interests, “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters,” Whalen left unclear what constituted a violation of the right, and 
failed to establish what type of constitutional treatment the courts were to 
use when assessing it.58 Unlike the Court’s second privacy interest in 
“independence in making certain kinds of important decisions,” which had 
been fleshed out by several previous Supreme Court decisions59 including 
Roe v. Wade60 and Paul v. Davis,61 there was no clear legal precedent for a 
privacy interest in nondisclosure of personal matters.62 
 
 
 57. Id. at 605. 
 58. See, e.g., Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Whalen provides little 
guidance regarding the nature of the confidentiality branch of the right of privacy.”); Plante v. 
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1133 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Because it determined that public disclosure was 
unlikely, the Court [in Whalen] did not address the standard to be applied to such public disclosure.”).  
 59. Courts were not confused by Whalen’s privacy interest in independence in making certain 
kinds of important decisions because the right encompassed other fundamental rights already 
guaranteed within the “zone of privacy.” See Borucki, 827 F.2d at 839; United States v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1087 (6th Cir. 1981). 
These fundamental rights included “matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education.” Borucki, 827 F.2d at 839 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). The Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of fundamental rights is considerably 
more developed than the right to nondisclosure of personal matters. Borucki, 827 F.2d at 839. 
 60. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (“[T]he right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, 
but . . . this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in 
regulation.”). 
 61. 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (holding that reputation alone does not implicate any liberty or 
property interest sufficient to invoke the protection of due process). In Paul v. Davis, Paul, a police 
officer, distributed flyers to local merchants warning against shoplifters in the area. Id. at 694–95. 
Davis was one of the “active shoplifters” identified on the flyer. Id. at 695. Davis sought relief against 
Paul’s alleged defamation under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that the flyer, 
which included his name and photograph, impermissibly violated his “liberty.” Id. at 697. The 
Supreme Court resoundingly rejected Davis’s argument. Id. at 698–99. In several of its previous 
decisions, the Supreme Court had recognized certain privacy protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, including “matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
and child rearing and education.” Id. at 713. Here, however, Davis’s claim was “based, not upon any 
challenge to the State's ability to restrict his freedom of action in a sphere contended to be ‘private,’ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/5
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, within the same year, again 
acknowledged the existence of a constitutional right to nondisclosure of 
personal matters in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.63 Former 
President Nixon, seeking to maintain the privacy of communications he 
made as President, challenged the constitutionality of a public law that 
granted access to his presidential communications in order to review and 
document them.64 The Supreme Court acknowledged that Nixon had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal materials;65 however, it 
found the intrusion justified by the greater public interest in archival 
screening.66 With little explanation, but citing Whalen v. Roe, the Court 
noted, “We may agree with [Nixon] that, at least when Government 
intervention is at stake, public officials, including the President, are not 
wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of 
personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public capacity.”67 
Multiple lower courts have since latched on to this language as further 
proof that the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right to 
nondisclosure of personal matters.68 
The constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal matters has not 
been addressed by the Supreme Court since its limited treatment in Nixon. 
As a result, the courts of appeals retain broad discretion in interpreting the 
right. Their decisions refer to Whalen’s “individual interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters” as the right to confidentiality.69 Whalen’s 
 
 
but instead on a claim that the State may not publicize a record of an official act such as an arrest.” Id. 
The Court concluded that “[n]one of our substantive privacy decisions hold this or anything like this, 
and we decline to enlarge them in this manner.” Id. Paul v. Davis was decided a year before Whalen.  
 62. In Whalen, the Court cited to four previous court opinions, two of which were dissents, as 
support for its determination that the nondisclosure of personal matters had legal precedent as a 
privacy interest. See supra note 46. Two courts of appeals, however, have questioned the relevance 
and precedential value of these cases. See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089 (6th Cir. 1981); Am. 
Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791–92 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). But see Bruce E. Falby, Comment, A Constitutional Right to Avoid Disclosure of Personal 
Matter: Perfecting Privacy Analysis in J.P. v. DeSanti, 71 GEO. L.J. 219, 232–34 (1982) (arguing that 
the cases cited by the Supreme Court in Whalen protect against nondisclosure of use). 
 63. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 64. Id. at 429–36. 
 65. The Court found that Nixon’s privacy claim was legitimate only in regard to the “extremely 
private communications between [Nixon] and, among others, his wife, his daughters, his physician, 
lawyer, and clergyman.” Id. at 459 (quoting the district court’s opinion, 408 F. Supp. 321, 359). These 
“extremely private communications” were commingled with, and amounted to only a very small 
fraction of, the massive volume of materials obtained by the archivists. Id. 
 66. Id. at 458. 
 67. Id. at 457 (emphasis added). 
 68. See, e.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1133 (5th Cir. 1978); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 
F.2d 836, 843–44 (1st Cir. 1987).  
 69. See, e.g., Borucki, 827 F.2d at 840 (identifying the individual interest in nondisclosure of 
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dual privacy interest, “independence in making certain kinds of decisions,” 
has been termed the right to autonomy.70  
C. Debate Over the Existence of the Right to Confidentiality Among the 
Courts of Appeals 
The courts of appeals have split over whether Whalen v. Roe created a 
constitutional right to confidentiality.  Nine courts of appeals have 
affirmed the existence of the right;71 two courts of appeals have practically 
denied it.72 In addition, the constitutional treatments used to assess the 
right contrast greatly among all the courts of appeals.73 
The seminal circuit court case affirming the constitutional right to 
confidentiality is the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp.74 In 1978, the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a federal agency, investigated 
complaints that Westinghouse’s Pennsylvania plant was infested with 
epoxy mold.75 As part of its investigation, NIOSH requested employee 
medical records from Westinghouse.76 After Westinghouse repeatedly 
refused to comply with NIOSH’s request, NIOSH sought legal action in 
district court.77 The district court, ruling in favor of NIOSH, rejected 
Westinghouse’s claim that its employee medical records were the type of 
information constitutionally protected from disclosure.78 On appeal, the 
Third Circuit applied a balancing test to assess Westinghouse’s 
nondisclosure claim.79 
 
 
personal matters as the “confidentiality” branch of the constitutional right to privacy).  
 70. Id. (identifying the individual interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions as the “autonomy” branch of the constitutional right to privacy). The autonomy branch of 
privacy includes those rights identified by the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis: “matters relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.” Id. at 839 
(citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). See also supra note 61. 
 71. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 72. See infra notes 102, 117 and accompanying text. 
 73. See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 74. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 75. Id. at 572–74. 
 76. Id. at 573. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. Relying on Whalen v. Roe, the district court held that NIOSH had authority to view the 
employees’ medical records given the public interest stake involved. Id. Westinghouse had not 
demonstrated that the government would improperly disclose the medical information. Id. 
Furthermore, the court found that NIOSH’s procedures for safeguarding the records were sufficiently 
adequate to ensure nondisclosure. Id.  
 79. Id. at 578. The Third Circuit had no problem identifying medical records as the type of 
information protected by the right to confidentiality and instead focused primarily on the issue of how 
to assess each party’s interest. Id. at 577–78 (“There can be no question that an employee’s medical 
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The Third Circuit recognized that, while the Supreme Court has 
allowed some intrusion into the right to privacy, “it has usually done so 
only after finding that the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the 
privacy interest on the specific facts of the case.”80 The court identified 
seven factors to consider in balancing the societal benefit of disclosing the 
medical records to NIOSH against the employees’ interest in privacy:81 1) 
the type of record requested, 2) the information the record does or might 
contain, 3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual 
disclosure, 4) the injury from disclosure in relation to the way in which the 
record was generated, 5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent an 
unauthorized disclosure, 6) the degree of need for the information, and 
finally, 7) whether an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, 
or other recognizable public interest militates in favor of access.82 
Applying these seven factors to the case at hand,83 the court concluded that 
the strong public interest in facilitating the research and investigations of 
NIOSH justified the minimal intrusion into Westinghouse’s employee 
medical records.84 
In addition to the Third Circuit, eight circuit courts have affirmed the 
constitutional right to confidentiality.85 Two of these courts did so 
specifically in the context of protecting medical records.86 Several of these 
courts have also adopted a balancing test similar to that used by the court 
 
 
records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials 
entitled to privacy protection.”).  
 80. Id. at 578. In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit cited Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
440 U.S. 301 (1979), wherein the Supreme Court held that the NLRB had improperly compelled 
disclosure of employees’ scores from psychological aptitude tests. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578. To 
reach this conclusion, the Supreme Court weighed the NLRB’s need for revealing the information 
against the strong interest of the company and its employees. Id. (citing Detroit Edison, 440 U.S. at 
315).  
 81. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 579–80. The court took particular note of the fact that Westinghouse failed to produce 
any evidence that the employee medical records contained information so highly sensitive that, if 
disclosed, employees would surely suffer adverse effects. Id. at 579. 
 84. Id. at 580. 
 85. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 
895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978); Kimberlin v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1986); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1996); In re 
Crawford, 194 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999); Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2006); James v. 
City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1991).  
 86. Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he right to confidentiality 
includes the right to protection regarding information about the state of one’s health.”); Roe v. Sherry, 
91 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a constitutional protection of privacy for HIV test 
results). 
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in Westinghouse to assess the right.87 However, there remains variability 
among the factors balanced by these courts.88  
A few circuit courts use dramatically different tests to assess the right 
to confidentiality.  For example, the Fourth Circuit in Walls v. City of 
Petersburg89 used a strict scrutiny test90 to conclude that Walls’s city 
employer had not violated her constitutional right to privacy when it 
required her to fill out a questionnaire asking about her sexual orientation, 
marital status, family history, and financial status.91 According to the 
Eighth Circuit, only “inherently private” information is entitled to 
constitutional confidentiality protection.92 This unique standard requires 
that the information disclosed be either a “shocking degradation or an 
 
 
 87. Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559–60 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Westinghouse and 
holding that “some form of intermediate scrutiny or balancing approach is appropriate as a standard of 
review”); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981) (“In deciding upon the merits of Fadjo’s 
case, the district court must balance the invasion of privacy alleged by Fadjo against any legitimate 
interests proven by the state.”); Roe v. Sherry, 91 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “[t]he 
government may obtain and use medical information if its interest in obtaining the information 
outweighs a person’s interest in privacy”) (citing Doe v. Att’y Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 
1991)). 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(balancing seven factors); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134–35 (5th Cir. 1978) (balancing four 
state concerns against the senators’ interests); Roe v. Sherry, 91 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(balancing four of the factors identified in Westinghouse). 
 89. 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 90. “If the information is protected by a person’s right to privacy, then the defendant has the 
burden to prove that a compelling governmental interest in disclosure outweighs the individual’s 
privacy interest.” Id. at 192. 
 91. Id. at 190–93. Walls brought a Title VII action against her city employer for firing her after 
she refused to complete a background questionnaire. Id. at 190. Walls specifically objected to four 
questions that asked about her family members’ criminal histories, her marriage status, whether or not 
she had ever had sexual relations with someone of the same sex, and asked her to list all her 
outstanding debts. Id. In assessing Walls’s privacy claim, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that 
Whalen protects two types of privacy interests. Despite this acknowledgment, it gave both interests 
identical strict scrutiny treatment, as if they encompassed one general right to privacy. Id. at 192. 
Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that the city had a compelling interest in obtaining Walls’s 
information and had exercised sufficient caution in order to protect her information from potential 
disclosure. Id. at 195. Therefore, the city had not violated Walls’s constitutional right to privacy. Id. 
 92. See Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996). In Eagle v. Morgan, David Eagle 
accepted a plea agreement stating that after serving minimal jail time and a six-year probation, his 
felony theft of property charge would be expunged. Id. at 622. Upon full compliance with the plea 
agreement, Eagle was released and became a city auditor. Id. When Eagle drew the displeasure of the 
local police department he was auditing, several police officers abused their access to city databases 
and, discovering Eagle’s past criminal record, divulged it to the public. Id. at 623. In assessing whether 
Eagle’s criminal record was the type of “inherently private” information entitled to protection, the 
Eighth Circuit considered the types of information to which other courts of appeals had extended 
protection. Id. at 625–26. Agreeing with three other courts of appeals, it concluded that because prior 
guilty pleas “are by their very nature matters within the public domain,” they are not inherently 
private. Id. at 625. Therefore, Eagle possessed no legitimate expectation of privacy and was not 
entitled to constitutional protection. Id. at 625–27. 
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egregious humiliation . . . .”93 Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate 
among many of the courts over whether the right to confidentiality is 
limited to only those fundamental matters guaranteed protection by the 
right to autonomy.94 
A First Circuit decision illustrates the complexity that results from the 
inconsistent approaches to the right of confidentiality. In Borucki v. 
Ryan,95 the First Circuit considered whether a prosecutor’s disclosures to 
the press concerning the contents of Borucki’s psychiatric report 
constituted a violation of Borucki’s right to privacy.96 Choosing to wash 
its hands of the conflict over the existence of a right to confidentiality,97 
the First Circuit held that because it was not “clearly established” that 
psychiatric reports are the type of thing protected by the right to privacy, 
the right to confidentiality did not apply.98 The court failed to explain what 
criteria were necessary to trigger a “clearly established” constitutional 
right to privacy.99 Rather, it deferred to the fact that none of the other 
 
 
 93. Id. at 625 (quoting Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993)). “‘[T]o violate 
[a person’s] constitutional right of privacy the information disclosed must be either a shocking 
degradation or an egregious humiliation of her to further some specific state interest, or a flagrant 
bre[a]ch of a pledge of confidentiality which was instrumental in obtaining the personal information.’” 
Eagle, 88 F.3d at 625 (quoting Alexander, 993 F.2d at 1350). 
 94. See, e.g., Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (“When the underlying claim is 
one of invasion of privacy, the complaint must be ‘limited to those [rights of privacy] which are 
“fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” . . .’”) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 
693, 713 (1976)). But compare Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is not clear 
whether the right of confidentiality covers all confidential information or only confidential information 
relating to certain matters.”). See also discussion infra note 112. 
 95. 827 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 96. Id. at 837. Borucki had been charged with damaging twenty-three aircraft at a Massachusetts 
airport. Id. Although Borucki had not offered a defense of insanity, the state district court ordered that 
Borucki be examined to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. Id. The criminal charges 
against Borucki were ultimately dismissed. Id. Following the dismissal of the charges, Ryan, the 
prosecutor, held a press conference during which he disclosed the information contained in Borucki’s 
psychiatric examination. Id. 
 97. The court offers a lengthy discussion of the differences of opinion among the courts of 
appeals regarding a constitutional right to confidentiality. Id. at 841–49. 
 98. Id. 
 99. In its analysis, the First Circuit gave substantial consideration to concerns over whether the 
right to confidentiality pertains only to those fundamental rights protected by the autonomy branch of 
the right to privacy, or whether the right to confidentiality is itself an independent right. Id. at 841–44. 
Ultimately, the court chose to refrain from reaching a conclusion concerning these two positions. 
Instead, it relied on the uncertainty of all the relevant areas of possible protection to conclude that 
psychiatric records do not fall with the privacy protection of the confidentiality branch. Id. at 845.  
 The court’s end result leaves its position with respect to the right of confidentiality unclear. 
Specifically, it is unclear whether it believes that no right to confidentiality exists because the right 
protects only those fundamental rights guaranteed by the autonomy branch of privacy, or because its 
fellow courts of appeals have yet to recognize the confidentiality of psychiatric records as a legitimate 
right to be protected. If the First Circuit meant to endorse the latter proposition, then it is interesting 
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courts of appeals recognized a similar privacy protection for psychiatric 
records.100 Furthermore, the court explicitly stated that it had no opinion as 
to whether the use of a balancing test is appropriate to assess whether the 
government possesses a valid public interest in disclosure.101 Thus, the 
First Circuit’s decision postponed a conclusive evaluation of the right to 
confidentiality, leaving such an analysis for a time when the parameters of 
the right are more clearly fleshed out. 
While the First Circuit appears hesitant to cast doubt on the existence 
of a right to confidentiality, the Sixth and D.C. Circuits are clearly not 
afraid to do so. In J.P. v. DeSanti,102 the Sixth Circuit considered the 
claims of juveniles who asserted that their probation officers violated their 
constitutional right to privacy when the officers compiled social histories 
about the juveniles.103 Among other things, the social histories contained 
information on and from complaining parties, the juveniles, their parents, 
school records, and the juveniles’ past records in court.104 The social 
histories were compiled nonconsensually by the court’s probation officers, 
and the juveniles and their families were denied access to them.105 Post-
adjudication, however, the social histories were made available to fifty-
five governmental, social, and religious agencies.106 
The juveniles claimed that the court’s uses of the social histories were 
unconstitutional and sought to enjoin access to them by anyone other than 
juvenile court personnel.107 While the district court found that the juvenile 
court’s post-adjudication dissemination of the social histories violated the 
juveniles’ constitutional right to privacy,108 the Sixth Circuit did not.109 In 
 
 
that it did not consider psychiatric records to fall within the general category of medical records, which 
have been protected by other courts of appeals. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 100. Borucki, 837 F.2d at 847–49. 
 101. Id. at 848 n.21. 
 102. 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 103. Id. at 1081. 
 104. Id. at 1082. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1085. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 1082. The district court held that the dissemination of the juveniles’ social histories 
amounted to an impermissible violation for two reasons. Id. at 1085–86. First, the disclosure violated 
the Ohio Code, which provided that “the reports and records of the probation department shall be 
considered confidential information and shall not be made public.” Id. (citing Ohio Rev. Code 
§ 2151.14). Second, the disclosure violated the “right of juveniles and their family members ‘to have 
intimate biographical details protected from exposure to the government.’” Id. at 1086. This second 
violation was unconstitutional. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1087. 
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particular, the Sixth Circuit chided the district court for failing to tie its 
analysis to any direct provision of the Constitution.110  
The Sixth Circuit rejected the notion that Whalen v. Roe created a right 
to confidentiality to be assessed according to a balancing test.  The court 
explicitly stated, “We do not view the discussion of confidentiality in 
Whalen v. Roe as . . . creating a constitutional right to have all government 
action weighed against the resulting breach of confidentiality.”111 Rather, 
the court considered the Supreme Court’s analysis in Whalen v. Roe as an 
isolated statement extending from the Supreme Court’s previous 
substantive due process decisions that conferred several specific 
fundamental privacy protections and only those protections.112 To allow 
otherwise would potentially require the courts to balance every 
government action against any intrusion of individual privacy.113 Such a 
task, the court argued, was better left to the states or the legislative 
process.114 Indeed, the court asserted that “[i]nferring very broad 
‘constitutional’ rights where the Constitution itself does not express them 
is an activity not appropriate to the judiciary.”115 Given the Sixth Circuit’s 
finding that protection of the juveniles’ social histories was not tantamount 
to a fundamental right, it is not surprising that the court held the disclosure 
constitutional.116 
 
 
 110. Id. at 1087. “The District Court made no attempt to tie the constitutional right ‘to have any 
intimate biographical details protected from exposure by the government’ to any particular provision 
of the Constitution.” Id. 
 111. Id. at 1088–89. 
 112. Id. at 1088–89. The Sixth Circuit believed that to conclude that Whalen v. Roe conferred 
constitutional protection to the juveniles’ records would require overruling Paul v. Davis. Id. In Paul v. 
Davis, the Supreme Court limited substantive due process protection as extending to only certain 
fundamental rights (“matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and 
child rearing and education”). 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). The problem the Sixth Circuit identified was 
that many of the protections provided by other courts of appeals asserting the right to confidentiality, 
including the Third Circuit’s protection of medical records in United States v. Westinghouse Electric 
Corp., did not fall within the parameters of the fundamental rights recognized in Paul v. Davis. 
DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1088. In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied on Justice 
Stewart’s concurrence in Whalen v. Roe. Id. at 1089. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart expressed his 
belief that the Supreme Court’s opinion did not establish a general right to nondisclosure of private 
information. Id. at 1089 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 433 U.S. 589, 608–09 (1977) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)). Given the assurances of Justice Stewart that no right to confidentiality was created in 
Whalen v. Roe, the Sixth Circuit was able to reconcile the decision with Paul v. Davis by construing 
the privacy interest in nondisclosure of personal matters as narrowly as possible. DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 
1089. 
 113. DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1090. 
 114. Id. at 1091. 
 115. Id. at 1090. 
 116. Id. at 1091. 
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The D.C. Circuit joined the Sixth Circuit’s critical analysis of the right 
to confidentiality in American Federation of Government Employees, 
AFL-CIO v. Department of Housing and Urban Development.117 The D.C. 
Circuit began its analysis by “expressing [its] grave doubts as to the 
existence of a constitutional right of privacy in the nondisclosure of 
personal information.”118 The right to confidentiality, it believed, 
amounted to little more than unresolved, “recurring dicta.”119 
Joined as two companion cases, AFL-CIO involved long-term 
employees of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
and the Department of Defense (DOD) who sought to enjoin HUD and 
DOD from subjecting them to periodic reinvestigation of private concerns, 
such as illegal drug use, mental health, and financial history, information 
about which both departments had previously acquired pre-
employment.120 Because the employees held sensitive or public trust 
positions, both HUD and DOD believed that it was necessary to 
continually investigate their fitness for employment.121 The D.C. Circuit 
agreed with the agencies.122 According to the court, the “numerous 
uncertainties” that surrounded the right to confidentiality made its 
constitutional protection unhelpful in this case.123 Because there was no 
indication that the results of the departments’ additional investigations 
would be revealed to the public,124 the court concluded that the individual 
interest in protecting the privacy of the information gathered was 
significantly less important than the departments’ interest in having the 
information.125  
 
 
 117. 118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 118. Id. at 791. The court then stated that were it the first to confront the issue of a right to 
nondisclosure of personal matters, it would have found “with little difficulty” that no right exists. Id. 
 119. Id. “The Supreme Court has addressed [the right to confidentiality] in recurring dicta without, 
we believe, resolving it.” Id. 
 120. Id. at 788–89. 
 121. Id. at 788. 
 122. Id. at 794.  
 123. Id. at 793. 
 124. Id. Security measures against disclosure included a policy prohibiting public dissemination, 
maintaining the records under secure conditions, and requiring background checks for those officials 
who had access to the records. Id. The court believed that these measures, designed to protect the 
confidentiality of the information, “substantially reduce[d] the employees’ privacy interests.” Id.  
 125. Id. at 794. The court concluded that HUD adequately defended its need for the employees’ 
information. Id. at 793. For example, HUD presented evidence that an employee who used illegal 
drugs would be more likely to make a negligent error on the job. Id. at 794. Because HUD’s 
employees have access to confidential information, it is important that they remain trustworthy. Id. In 
order to ensure that the employees possessed the level of trust necessary to perform their jobs, HUD 
had a legitimate interest in discovering which of its employees were illegal drug users or were in 
financial trouble. Id.  
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Like the Sixth Circuit in DeSanti, the D.C. Circuit expressed in AFL-
CIO its concern that none of the circuit courts upholding the right to 
confidentiality cited a particular provision of the Constitution in doing 
so.126 Finding that no such provision existed,127 the court thought it 
improper to extend the privacy right unless there was proof that the 
government would publicly disseminate the information it collected.128 
Because HUD and DOD presented sufficient evidence to indicate that the 
information collected would not be disseminated,129 the court concluded 
that their intrusions were permissible.130 
III. ANALYSIS 
On the surface, there appear to be two contrasting interpretations of 
Whalen v. Roe among the courts of appeals: one that affirms the existence 
of a constitutional right to confidentiality and one that questions it.131 
Grouping the various interpretations of Whalen v. Roe into one of these 
two overarching, opposing viewpoints, however, oversimplifies the 
opinions of the circuit courts. For example, among those courts that affirm 
the existence of a right to confidentiality, numerous divisions exist over 
the type and amount of constitutional treatment the right should receive.132 
Among those courts that question the right, there is division over the 
primary reason to reject it.133 Rather than two dichotomous interpretations 
of Whalen v. Roe, in reality a spectrum of twelve different interpretations 
exists. As a result, the privacy protection afforded by the right to 
confidentiality remains questionable, at best.  
Of all the courts of appeals, the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in AFL-CIO is 
the most persuasive interpretation of the right to confidentiality. The D.C. 
 
 
 126. Id. at 793. 
 127. Id. at 791. “The Court [in Whalen v. Roe] cited two dissents [in asserting a right to 
nondisclosure of information], Olmstead v. United States and California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
neither of which argued for a general constitutional right to privacy in the nondisclosure of 
information.” Id. at 791–92 (citations omitted). 
 128. Id. at 793. 
 129. See supra note 124. 
 130. AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at 795. 
 131. See supra Part III. 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (using a 
balancing approach to assess the right to confidentiality). But see Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 
188 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying a strict scrutiny test). 
 133. See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981) (failing to recognize the right to 
confidentiality, among other reasons, because doing so would conflict with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Paul v. Davis). But see Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (relying primarily on lack of a well-established right to 
conclude that a right to confidentiality does not exist).  
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Circuit correctly points out that in both Whalen v. Roe and Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services, the Supreme Court gave little more 
than a passing glance to the right to confidentiality.134 In Whalen v. Roe, 
the Supreme Court asserted that the right to confidentiality “arguably has 
its roots in the Constitution,” but it failed to identify where.135 Indeed, 
none of the precedent cited by the Supreme Court in reference to the right 
to confidentiality affords constitutional protection against the 
nondisclosure of personal matters.136 Instead, the cases protect various 
privacy concerns emanating from other clearly defined rights, such as 
illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.137 Justice Stewart 
acknowledged this problem with the Supreme Court’s analysis in his 
concurrence in Whalen v. Roe.138  
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Supreme Court only 
suggested that it “may agree” with the protection of privacy rights in 
matters of personal life.139 Furthermore, in neither Whalen nor Nixon did 
the Supreme Court offer any analytical framework for interpreting the 
 
 
 134. AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at 791. 
 135. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (emphasis added).  
 136. See infra note 137; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 608–09 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 137. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 608–09. For example, in support of the right to confidentiality, the 
Supreme Court cites to Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.25. In Olmstead, Justice Brandeis argued that federal officers violated 
Olmstead’s Fourth Amendment protection against unwarranted searches and seizures when they 
wiretapped his telephone conversations. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Invoking 
the Founding Fathers in support of his assertion, Justice Brandeis wrote:  
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their 
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, 
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever 
the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 478.  
 Without question, this powerful language evokes the American sentiment that privacy is a value. 
The Supreme Court certainly seemed to believe as much since it quoted part of Brandeis’s text in 
reference to the right to confidentiality. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.25. The problem with Olmstead, 
however, is that its lengthy opinion says nothing about protecting the nondisclosure of personal 
matters. Rather, Olmstead’s “right to be let alone,” Justice Brandeis argues, grows out of a clear 
constitutional guarantee: the Fourth Amendment. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. This is unlike the right to 
confidentiality, which does not have a clear constitutional guarantee from which it can be recognized. 
For this reason, it seems far-reaching for the Supreme Court in Whalen to cite Olmstead in support of a 
constitutional right to confidentiality.  
 138. In his concurrence in Whalen v. Roe, Justice Stewart concludes that the right to 
confidentiality is not a constitutionally protected right based on past Supreme Court precedent. 
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 608–09 (Stewart, J., concurring). Specifically, he analyzed the two opinions cited 
by the majority in support of the right to confidentiality, Griswold v. Connecticut and Stanley v. 
Georgia, and concluded that neither recognizes a privacy interest in nondisclosure of personal matters. 
Id.  
 139. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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right to confidentiality.140 This suggests that the Supreme Court itself was 
unsure how much protection the right should receive. 
The Sixth Circuit’s rationale for doubting the existence of a right to 
confidentiality is less persuasive than the D.C. Circuit’s because it 
conflates the right to confidentiality with the right to autonomy. According 
to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in DeSanti, the existence of a right to 
confidentiality is doubtful not only because the right lacks textual support 
from the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent, but also because it is 
irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Paul v. Davis 
concerning the right to autonomy.141 Several authors, however, have 
explained why this analysis is mistaken.142 The right to confidentiality is a 
privacy right distinct and separate from the right to autonomy.143 The 
Supreme Court made this clear in Whalen v. Roe when it failed to cite to 
Paul v. Davis in reference to the right to confidentiality, yet explicitly did 
so in reference to the right to autonomy.144 Absent its mistaken conflation 
of the two privacy interests, the Sixth Circuit offers no other plausible 
reason to narrowly construe the right to confidentiality so as to practically 
deny it. 
Least persuasive of all are the opinions of the courts of appeals that 
affirm the right to confidentiality. Their analyses are unconvincing for four 
reasons. First, the constitutional treatment they apply is inconsistent. 
Every court of appeals that affirms the right to confidentiality relies on a 
different test to reach its determination.145 Even among the majority of 
 
 
 140. Bruce W. Clark, Note, The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
133, 135 (1982); Falby, supra note 62, at 237. In his concurrence in Whalen v. Roe, Justice Brennan 
suggests that requiring a compelling state interest may be appropriate in assessing the right to 
confidentiality. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Broad dissemination by state 
officials of [private] information, however, would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy 
rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests.”). Indeed, a few of the 
courts of appeals have adopted such a test. See, e.g., Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 914 (10th Cir. 
2006) (“Disclosure of [constitutionally] protected information must ‘advance a compelling state 
interest which, in addition, must be accomplished in the least intrusive manner.’”) (citing Mangels v. 
Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986)). Justice Stewart rejects Justice Brennan’s compelling 
interest test in his own concurrence. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607–09 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 141. See supra note 112. 
 142. See Clark, supra note 140, at 142 (“Reliance on Paul v. Davis in determining the application 
of the right to confidentiality is inappropriate.”); Falby, supra note 62, at 223 (“[The Sixth Circuit in 
DeSanti] erred in ruling the disclosure of the histories ‘indistinguishable’ from the disclosure of the 
fact of arrest in Paul [v. Davis].”). 
 143. “Although it characterizes interests in avoiding publication of personal information and in 
autonomous decision making as facets of the right to privacy, the Whalen opinion clearly differentiates 
the two interests and treats each as giving rise to an independent constitutional claim.” Clark, supra 
note 140, at 142. 
 144. See supra note 46. 
 145. See supra note 88. See also Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) 
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courts that support the use of a balancing test, the factors they rely on 
differ.146 This division of treatment highlights one of the major practical 
problems for litigants bringing claims under the right to confidentiality.147 
Because there is neither consensus as to which level of treatment the right 
should be afforded, nor consensus over which factors should apply when a 
balancing test is used, the right is inconsistently recognized and applied.148 
This results in confusion for both the government and private litigants who 
must endure different constitutional treatment depending on the circuit in 
which they bring their cases.  
Second, despite the differing constitutional treatments that pervade the 
courts, only under the most egregious factual circumstances will the 
individual litigant likely prevail, regardless of the court in which the case 
is brought.149 This outcome seems contrary to the ideals espoused in the 
courts’ opinions, which often strongly assert the importance of preserving 
nondisclosure of personal matters and the need for confidential material to 
be constitutionally protected.150 The fact that so few private litigants 
prevail makes the practice of recognizing the right to confidentiality 
inadequate, since it subverts the very purpose of recognizing the right in 
the first place. There is little reason behind recognizing a right that, in 
practice, no court will uphold.  
One explanation for this inadequacy is that, in the majority of courts 
using a balancing test, little weight is given to the private litigant’s 
 
 
(applying a test of strict scrutiny in reaching its determination); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 
(8th Cir. 1996) (providing protection only to disclosure of “inherently private” information); Anderson 
v. Blake, 469 U.S. F.3d 910, 914 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the state must demonstrate that it had a 
compelling interest for disclosure and that it used the least intrusive means of disclosing the 
information). 
 146. See supra note 88. 
 147. For example, in a case concerning a surgeon diagnosed with AIDS who sued the hospital 
where he worked for requiring his patients to sign an “unusual consent form” notifying them of the 
surgeon’s AIDS status before undergoing surgery, the trial judge admitted that he “has been unable to 
elicit a standard against which to gauge the hospital’s actions.” Joseph F. Sullivan, Should a Hospital 
Tell Patients if a Surgeon Has AIDS?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1989, at B1. The judge was also 
“concern[ed] about the line he may be asked to draw between a patient’s right to know and a 
physician’s right to confidentiality about his own health.” Id. 
 148. See supra notes 88, 145. 
 149. “[C]ourts have been willing to uphold statutes giving only the barest minimum of safeguards 
. . . .” Jessica Ansley Bodger, Note, Taking the Sting Out of Reporting Requirements: Reproductive 
Health Clinics and the Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 56 DUKE L.J. 583, 607 (2006). 
 150. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Th[e] right [to confidentiality] is a 
venerable one whose constitutional significance we have recognized . . . .”); Walls v. City of 
Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 194–95 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Although some of this information can be useful 
and even necessary to maintain order and provide communication and convenience in a complex 
society, we need to be ever diligent to guard against misuse. Some information still needs to be 
private, disclosed to the public only if the person voluntarily chooses to disclose it.”). 
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individual interest in privacy.151 For example, despite its lengthy seven-
factor test, the seminal balancing test used by the Third Circuit in United 
States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. provides no distinct factor 
representing the private litigant’s individual reasons for seeking 
confidentiality.152 In fact, the Third Circuit only considers the individual’s 
privacy interest in relation to the public need for access.153 This standard 
necessarily results in unfavorable treatment for the private litigant whose 
reasons for desiring confidentiality are not even considered a distinct, 
viable factor worthy of balancing. It also renders the balancing test 
inherently tilted in favor of the government since all the factors take into 
consideration the government’s interest and none independently represent 
the private litigant’s individual interest. While this tilt is not necessarily 
improper,154 it certainly accounts for the private litigant’s lack of privacy 
protection.  
Third, like the Sixth Circuit in DeSanti, the First and Eighth Circuits 
only extend constitutional confidentiality protection to those certain 
matters protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to 
autonomy.155 Under this type of treatment, the confidentiality of medical 
records is not constitutionally protected.156 Furthermore, this type of 
treatment reduces the significance of the right to confidentiality, since 
arguably every breach of confidentiality also necessarily triggers the 
privacy protection of the right to autonomy.157  
 
 
 151. The Fifth Circuit is the only court of appeals using a balancing test recognizing that 
“[p]rivacy of personal matters is an interest in and of itself.” Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135 
(5th Cir. 1978). 
 152. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 153. Id. 
 154. The Supreme Court has always held that the right to privacy is not absolute. Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). There are legitimate reasons for the government to acquire and retain 
information concerning private citizens. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977). 
 155. O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 545–46 (1st Cir. 1976); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 
625 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 156. In addition to a lack of protection for medical records, other confidential matters, such as 
financial records and one’s sexual orientation, are also unprotected. Such an outcome is in direct 
conflict with other courts that have already recognized constitutional protection for these matters. See 
Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000) (sexual orientation); Plante v. 
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1136 (5th Cir. 1978) (financial records). 
 157. It would seem remiss for the Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe to take the time to distinguish 
between the right to confidentiality and the right to autonomy only to provide that they are, in fact, the 
same type of right and thus, afforded the same constitutional protection. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
could not have intended such a result because it refrained from applying strict scrutiny in Whalen v. 
Roe, which it would have done had the New York State Controlled Substances Act implicated a 
fundamental right. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are 
involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 
‘compelling state interest . . . .’”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p653 Wilson book pages.doc2/7/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
674 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:653 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the confidentiality protection provided by these courts of 
appeals guarantees only a reasonable expectation of privacy, rather than 
allowing individuals to protect their privacy in accordance with their own 
personal preferences. Balancing tests limit privacy protection to whatever 
courts deem should be private, since the weighing of interests necessarily 
assumes there are legitimate instances in which the public interest 
outweighs an individual’s interest and vice versa.158 This protection is 
limiting because it disregards the fact that what some individuals would 
regard as private information, others would not.159 If privacy is something 
that stems from an individual’s sense of values—and the Supreme Court 
seems to say so in its final thought in Whalen v. Roe160—then privacy 
protection needs to be based on a system that protects an individual’s 
personal assessment of his privacy interests, rather than a system that 
imposes societal notions of privacy on every individual.161 
The inconsistent and inadequate privacy protection that pervades the 
constitutional analysis applied by courts that affirm the right to 
confidentiality lends further support to the D.C. Circuit’s belief that the 
right to confidentiality suffers from too “numerous uncertainties” to be 
helpful.162 In total, these uncertainties amount to a privacy protection that 
lacks the value that the Supreme Court sensed was important and 
attempted to preserve in Whalen v. Roe.163 Given the questionable state of 
the right to confidentiality and the Supreme Court’s disinclination to 
address the issue further, confidential materials require an alternative legal 
doctrine to ensure their protection. 
IV. PROTECTING PRIVACY 
The Supreme Court made some attempt to protect the nondisclosure of 
personal matters in Whalen v. Roe.164 Yet the Court clearly did not want to 
give nondisclosure of personal matters the same level of protection as 
other fundamental rights.165 Given the questionable state of the right to 
 
 
 158. Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 6, at 162–63. 
 159. Allen-Castellitto, supra note 25, at 29. 
 160. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 161. See generally Amy Peikoff, No Corn on This Cobb: Why Reductionists Should Be All Ears 
for Pavesich, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 751, 784–88 (2004) (arguing that the right to privacy, as originally 
conceived, is based on moral and political first principles meant to protect an individual’s private 
information from being surrendered to society). 
 162. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 164. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977). 
 165. Id. 
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confidentiality and the inconsistent and inadequate privacy protection 
provided currently by the courts of appeals, how can confidentiality be 
protected? This Note proposes that the answer to that question lies not in 
constitutional law but in privacy tort law.166 In the context of medical 
records, tort law provides the best protection against those who, without 
authorization, seek to acquire information from confidential health 
records.167 
Privacy tort law protects against breaches of confidential medical 
records in one of two ways: via a theory of implied contract or via a theory 
of fiduciary duty.168 A theory of implied contract arises when a patient and 
physician fail to sign a contract barring the physician from disclosing 
certain confidential information, yet such a contract is implied based on 
the particular nature of the patient-physician relationship.169 A theory of 
fiduciary duty arises when a patient enters a relationship with a physician 
under the expectation that the physician will act with good will to care for 
the patient’s health.170 The legal purpose for recognizing a breach of 
implied contract or fiduciary duty is the same as that underlying the 
 
 
 166. A similar suggestion was presented by Bruce Watson as a solution for protecting privacy in 
the face of increased use of computerized healthcare information. Bruce L. Watson, Disclosure of 
Computerized Health Care Information: Provider Privacy Rights Under Supply Side Competition, 7 
AM. J.L. & MED. 265, 285–99 (1981). More recently, Eugene Volokh has suggested an analogous 
solution for privacy protections involving free speech and the internet. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking 
About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000). In his article, Volokh asserts that existing contract law is 
“eminently defensible under existing free speech doctrine.” Id. at 1057. He argues that implied 
contracts, which promise confidentiality, allow for speakers to contract not to speak. Id. at 1058. The 
freedom of the individual to contract his own speech restrictions, he argues, is a preferable option to 
expanding speech restrictions already in force, such as commercial speech and speech on matters of 
private concern. Id. at 1080–1106.  
 167. See Richard C. Turkington, Legal Protection for the Confidentiality of Health Care 
Information in Pennsylvania: Patient and Client Access; Testimonial Privileges; Damage Recovery for 
Unauthorized Extra-Legal Disclosure, 32 VILL. L. REV. 259, 375–86 (1987). See generally William J. 
Winslade & Judith Wilson Ross, Privacy, Confidentiality, and Autonomy in Psychotherapy, 64 NEB. L. 
REV. 578, 584–606 (1985) (describing privacy tort law protections for medical patients). 
 168. Turkington, supra note 167, at 383–85. Other common law torts provide protection against 
privacy invasions. These torts include “disclosure of private facts, appropriation of name or likeness 
for personal advantage, intrusion of one’s physical solitude or seclusion, and publicity that places one 
in a false light in the public eye.” Scott L. Fast, Comment, Breach of Employee Confidentiality: 
Moving Toward a Common-Law Tort Remedy, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1993) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977)). Some of these torts lend well to the context of the 
physician-patient relationship, while others do not. See Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: 
An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1428–48 (1982) (discussing the merits of the various 
common law privacy torts). This Note relies on an analysis of the two privacy torts identified by 
Richard Turkington in his article, both of which Turkington believes the most suitable for protection of 
medical records. See Turkington, supra note 167, at 383–86. 
 169. Turkington, supra note 167, at 383. 
 170. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (8th ed. 2004). 
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concern for constitutional protection: privacy is needed to foster a 
relationship of trust between physician and patient; otherwise individuals 
may be deterred from seeking medical attention or may not fully disclose 
their medical history to their physician, thereby resulting in diminished or 
inadequate medical care.171 A third party that induces the breach of either 
an implied contract or fiduciary duty is liable to the patient for that 
breach.172 Thus, both theories create a cause of action against government 
officials who, acting as third parties, attempt to breach the patient-
physician relationship in order to gain access to private medical records.  
Both a theory of implied contract and a theory of fiduciary duty 
provide more protection to the nondisclosure of personal matters than any 
current constitutional protection. Unlike the current constitutional tests 
used by the circuit courts, which are inconsistently applied and often result 
in confusion, theories of implied contract and fiduciary duty are well 
recognized by courts and are applied consistently.173 Thus, they are more 
predictable for litigants. Also, unlike balancing tests, both theories protect 
a patient’s confidentiality by presuming a guarantee of confidentiality 
upfront. Any party that attempts to breach an implied contract or fiduciary 
duty can be enjoined from doing so, as opposed to current constitutional 
balancing tests, which only recognize a violation after the breach of 
privacy has already occurred.174 Privacy tort law also avoids the confusion 
and conflation of the two privacy interests expressed in Whalen v. Roe.175 
Through tort law, confidential privacy protection can extend to include, 
among other things, medical records, financial records, and psychiatric 
records.176 Thus, confidential privacy protection cannot be limited to only 
those rights that fall under the right to autonomy. 
 
 
 171. These were the very concerns that the Supreme Court acknowledged in Whalen v. Roe in 
asserting a constitutional right to confidentiality. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. But 
see Winslade & Ross, supra note 167, at 584–85 (explaining how constitutional law protects only 
restrictions against individual privacy and tort law protects invasions of individual privacy). 
 172. Turkington, supra note 167, at 384. 
 173. Id. at 384–85 n.408 (citing the following states as recognizing causes of action for privacy 
torts: Alabama, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and Utah).  
 174. In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court did not decide the result of an unwarranted disclosure 
of privacy, intentional or not. Whalen, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1977). The Court’s holding pertained 
only to whether the Fourteenth Amendment was violated. Id. at 606. As a result, it is unclear whether 
constitutional protection for the right of constitutionality extends to potential privacy invasions. If the 
government can show that it has taken sufficient precautions to avoid disclosure, the right likely does 
not extend to potential privacy invasions. Whalen v. Roe suggests such an outcome since the Supreme 
Court relied on the fact that New York had taken multiple steps to avoid disclosure of the information 
it collected. See discussion supra note 53. 
 175. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 156. 
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Theories of implied contract and fiduciary duty protect an individual’s 
privacy at a level commensurate with his personal views about privacy, as 
opposed to a societal expectation of privacy.177 Each patient has the 
freedom to assess his personal sense of privacy and decide whether or not 
to make his medical information available to third parties. If he does not 
want his medical information shared, then he can enjoin a third party from 
gaining access to it. If he would like to share his medical information, then 
he can consent to a third party’s acquisition of his records. This freedom is 
not available under current constitutional tests, which permit a third party 
to violate a patient’s confidentiality absent consent whenever a court 
determines that the third party’s interest is more important than the 
individual’s interest.178  
Furthermore, like constitutional privacy principles,179 a theory of 
implied contract or fiduciary duty does not make privacy protection 
absolute.180 Both can be limited in two important instances: when a patient 
consents to disclosure, or when the disclosure furthers an overriding, 
legislatively mandated public interest.181 In the second instance, the 
government may still be able to gain access to confidential patient 
information; however, it may do so only when the legislature explicitly 
directs such disclosure—an outcome that may prove difficult to achieve as 
constituents become increasingly wary of privacy invasions by the 
government. 
 
 
 177. Edgar and Sandomire argue that “[r]estricting protection to medical records rather than 
protecting broad categories of information may lead to anomalous results.” Edgar & Sandimore, supra 
note 6, at 163. They cite as an example the fact that HIV laws restrict HIV test disclosures, but do not 
similarly limit clinical diagnoses of AIDS. Id. at 163. This concern can be ameliorated under a theory 
of implied contract or fiduciary duty, because individual litigants can decide for themselves which 
breaches of confidentiality they do not wish to permit. Using the above example, the disclosure of 
clinical diagnoses of AIDS is significant only if an individual litigant believes such a disclosure is 
inappropriate. Anomalous results are not a bad thing. Rather, they are an illustration of what certain 
people consider an impermissible invasion of their privacy, and what others simply do not. 
 178. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(concluding that the strong public interest in facilitating the research and investigations of NIOSH 
justified the minimal intrusion into Westinghouse’s employee medical records). 
 179. See discussion supra note 154. 
 180. Turkington, supra note 167, at 385. 
 181. Id. Express consent is an absolute defense to privacy torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 583 (1965). Public interest in disclosure is a conditional defense to privacy torts. Id. § 652G. 
It requires legislative authority expressly authorizing nonconsensual disclosure. 
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However, there remain many potential problems with privacy tort 
protections.182 One potentially significant problem is that the government 
may retain sovereign immunity183 against third-party implied contract or 
fiduciary duty causes of action. Protecting confidentiality through the 
tortious breach of the physician-patient relationship would be futile in the 
face of a government body that can intrude as a third party, obtain 
confidential medical records, and avoid being sued. Indeed, one of the 
definite advantages of having a constitutional right to confidentiality is 
that the problem of sovereign immunity is avoided.184 The problem of 
sovereign immunity, however, may be averted in certain contexts, such as 
against municipalities, which are excluded from sovereign immunity 
specifically to ensure that they remain accountable for impinging on the 
rights of their citizens.185 If privacy tort protection proves insufficient due 
to sovereign immunity problems, then legislation may be needed to ensure 
that this protection is given full force.186 
Theories of implied contract and fiduciary duty, while themselves 
incontrovertible common law principles, are relatively new in their 
application to confidentiality protection.187 For this reason and those 
mentioned above, this area of privacy law still requires more development. 
What is clear, however, is that both theories offer more consistent and 
 
 
 182. Potential problems include: What sort of protection is there for communications in which 
there is no social convention of confidentiality? See Volokh, supra note 166, at 1058. In a similar vein, 
what happens when a patient seeking group medical care desires confidentiality? See Winslade & 
Ross, supra note 167, at 610. Another limiting factor may be privileges extended by state governments 
requiring certain types of individuals, such as physicians or newsmen, to make disclosures. Edgar & 
Sandomire, supra note 6, at 162. See generally Vickery, supra note 168, at 1437–48 (discussing the 
inadequacies of current privacy tort laws). 
 183. Sovereign immunity is guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment, which states, “The Judicial 
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has devised three methods to 
circumvent the Eleventh Amendment, thereby allowing federal courts limited means to ensure that 
states comply with federal law. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 395 (4th ed. 2003). 
These three methods include allowing state officers to be sued individually, permitting states to waive 
their sovereign immunity, and sanctioning “litigation against the states pursuant to statutes adopted 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.  
 184. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1976), the Supreme Court held that citizens 
my sue states for claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 183, at 
446–47 (discussing how Congress can authorize suits against the states pursuant to section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
 185. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 183, at 413. The exception for municipalities would allow 
diabetes patients to sue New York City’s DOHMH to seek an injunction preventing DOHMH from 
enrolling them in the pilot intervention program.  
 186. Watson, supra note 166, at 298–99 (suggesting the need for the federal government and state 
legislatures to provide quality controls through legislation to facilitate actions for tortious breaches). 
 187. Vickery, supra note 168, at 1454–55. 
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adequate privacy protection than that afforded by the constitutional right 
to confidentiality. Indeed, legal scholarship is increasingly recognizing the 
value of these theories as viable alternatives for privacy protection.188 In 
the face of increased privacy violations of medical records, theories of 
implied contract and fiduciary duty offer a compelling alternative to the 
questionable right to confidentiality. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the current inconsistent and inadequate privacy protection 
offered by the right to confidentiality, New York City’s diabetes program, 
if challenged, would likely be held constitutional.189 Nonetheless, this 
outcome would seem to run counter to the Supreme Court’s general belief 
expressed in Whalen v. Roe that privacy is something that is rooted in the 
Constitution and should be protected.190 Privacy values are violated when 
the government directly intrudes on the physician-patient relationship, 
which New York City clearly does with its pilot intervention program in 
the South Bronx.  
New York City’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene violates 
patients’ privacy rights when it seizes confidential medical records in 
order to offer unsolicited medical advice. This seems especially egregious 
when the government caller who contacts the patient and physician 
possesses no medical expertise.191 However, patients cannot solve this 
problem by asserting a constitutional right to privacy, since any individual 
patient’s interest in privacy would likely succumb to the government’s 
putative public health interest. 
As an unauthorized third party, New York City’s DOHMH breaches 
the confidence of the patient-physician relationship when it induces 
medical laboratories to provide it with patients’ A1C blood test results.192 
DOHMH does the same when it nonconsensually contacts patients to 
inform them about their blood test results.193 These intrusive acts give rise 
to a cause of action under both a theory of implied contract and a theory of 
fiduciary duty. Accordingly, patients who are injured by New York City’s 
 
 
 188. See, e.g., Fast, supra note 168; Vickery, supra note 168. 
 189. “Conventional public health reporting statutes . . . will pass constitutional muster even if 
Whalen is used to limit government power to collect health information about named individuals.” 
Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 6, at 165. 
 190. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.  
 191. See supra note 18. 
 192. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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breach of their patient-physician relationships should file suit and 
demonstrate that the theories of implied contract and fiduciary duty offer a 
plausible solution to privacy protection absent a constitutional right. 
Jessica C. Wilson∗ 
 
 
 ∗ B.A. Slavic Languages & Literature (2005), Duke University; J.D. Candidate (2008), 
Washington University School of Law. I would like to thank Jessica Golby for her advice and counsel 
throughout the writing of this Note. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/5
